It is in the business market that Michael Dell has always seen his major competitors--Compaq and
IBM. "From the first day I interviewed with the company in 1987, Michael made it clear that our
goal was to be mentioned by customers in the same sentence with IBM and Compaq," says Brian
Fawkes, one of Dell's first hundred employees. "This focus has never wavered. There was a time
when another Austin-based PC manufacturer called CompuAdd reported higher revenues than Dell,
and people started saying, 'We have to attack CompuAdd.' But Michael kept us concentrating on
Compaq and IBM, which was the right thing to do. CompuAdd is gone."
邁克爾·戴爾總是在市場上觀察他的主要競爭對手--康柏和IBM。"從我在1987年第一次到這家公司面試起
，邁克爾就清楚地告訴我們，我們的目標是被客戶談起，就象對康柏和IBM一樣。"戴爾最早的一百個職員之一
，Brian Fawkes說，"這個觀點從來就沒有動搖過。有一次另一家以奧斯汀為基地的叫CompuAdd的PC制造商報
道它的年收入超過了戴爾，大家開始說,'我們必須向CompuAdd進攻了'。但邁克爾讓我們專注于康柏和IBM，因
為這才是要做的事。現在CompuAdd已經消失了。"
Everybody calls him Michael. Everybody.
每個人都稱呼他邁克爾。每個人。
While Dell was always focused on the bigger companies, it took a while for Compaq and IBM to
notice Dell. "In 1989, Michael's company was growing from PC's Limited to Dell Computer,"
recalls Patrick Dryden, who was then a reporter and is now an analyst for the Giga Information
Group. "I interviewed Rod Canion, one of the Compaq founders, about growth plans and targets; at
that time, Compaq still had its sights set on surpassing IBM, and it was considered a very
ambitious goal. What about Dell Computer and its early success with the direct-sale model?
Canion sneered and referred to PC's Limited as a novelty that wouldn't last. Later, I recounted
the episode to Michael. He was hurt, genuinely pained to be dismissed in such an offhand way by
someone he respected as a competitor. Not long after that, Dell Computer pointedly attacked
Compaq in ads that depicted an empty-headed sales guy in a chain store."
雖然戴爾總是集中注意力于大公司，但過了一段時間后康柏和IBM才開始注意戴爾。"1989年，邁克爾的公
司正在從PC's Limited成長為戴爾計算機公司。"當時是一名記者，現在是技嘉信息集團分析員的Patrick
Dryden回憶，"我采訪了康柏的創始人之一Rod Canion有關增長計劃和目標的情況；當時，康柏仍然把視線集
中在超越IBM，這被認為是一個非常有野心的目標。對戴爾計算機和它的直接銷售模式的早期成功你有什么看
法？Canion對此很不屑一顧，他稱PC's Limited是一個小玩意，不會持續太久。后來，我向邁克爾敘述了這段
情節。他覺得受到了傷害，為被他尊為對手的人以這種唐突的方式奚落他而感到痛苦。不久以后，戴爾計算機
在廣告中描寫了一個在連鎖店里的沒有頭腦的銷售員，用此來尖銳地攻擊康柏。"
Don't offend a 24-year-old CEO with a large ad budget. While Compaq is still the PC sales
leader, Dell is a close second in the U.S. and actually beats Compaq in corporate desktop-PC
sales. And Rod Canion is long gone.
不能用一大筆廣告預算冒犯一個24歲的CEO。雖然康柏仍然是PC銷售的老大，但是戴爾在美國非常接近地
排在第二位，而實際上在公司的臺式機銷售上已經擊敗了康柏。而Rod Canion已經離開很久了。
Not even the savviest twentysomething CEO knows everything, so Dell imported over the years
a variety of older experts from other companies. It was a cheaper alternative to Compaq's
tendency to grow by acquisition. Dell just bought the people, sometimes discarding them when he
had learned what they had to teach. This was the case when Dell recruited Graham Beachum, an
experienced executive from IBM and Tandy. Beachum arrived in the year prior to Dell's initial
public offering, bringing with him a number of experienced associates just in time to bulk up
(and make older) Dell's executive ranks for the IPO. Two years after the IPO, Beachum and his
people were gone.
即便是最精明的二十多歲的CEO也不會知道所有的事情，因此這些年戴爾從其它公司吸收了許多老專家。
這相對康柏通過收購而增長的傾向是一種更廉價的替代方案。戴爾只接受人，往往當他已經學會他們所教的之
后解雇他們。例如戴爾從IBM吸收了Graham Beachum，他是一位有經驗的管理人員，Tandy Beachum也在戴爾開
始上市前一年就來了，并帶來了許多有經驗的同事，及時地壯大了（并且增大了年齡）戴爾的IPO（開始上市
）管理隊伍。在IPO兩年后，Beachum和他的手下都離開了。
（未完待續）
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